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WHAT TO DO WHEN YOU'RE AMBUSHED BY UNDISCLOSED EVIDENCE OF UNADJUDICATED
ACTS TO SHOW FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
BY: DOUGLAS S. COLLICA
You are defense counsel in a capital murder trial in the Common-
wealth of Virginia. Earlier in the day, the jury returned a guilty verdict,
convicting your client of capital murder. Tomorrow morning he penalty
phase will begin.During the guiltphase of the trial you hadfiledamotion
requesting the Commonwealth to reveal the evidence itplanned to use to
prove future dangerousness if the defendant was found guilty. In re-
sponse only three days ago, the Commonwealth'sAttorney statedthat the
Commonwealth would introduce statements that the defendantallegedly
made about other crimes, including a double murder. It is now the
evening before the penalty phase is to begin and the Commonwealth's
Attorney has just informed you that despite the earlier pledge to only
introduce the defendant's statements, the Commonwealth now intends to
offer actual evidence of the double murder in addition to the incriminat-
ing statements. This evidence consists oftestimony by thepolice detective
who investigated the double murder and by the state medical examiner
who performed the victims' autopsies. The additional evidence is also to
include photographs and forensic evidence of the crime scene.
As alarming as the previous scenario is, it is the fact pattern of a
Virginia case, Gray v. Thompson,1 that now sits before the United States
Supreme Court. This article will examine different responses by defense
counsel when faced with surprise evidence of unadjudicated acts.
I. Object Loudly And In As Many Ways As Possible
A. Object Strenuously on the Record
Recent Fourth Circuit opinions make clear that simply stating your
objection on the record leads to a negative inference - that if defense
counsel did not object strenuously, counsel could not have been greatly
disadvantaged. Consequently, you must make your objection formally
on the record and develop at length how, without a continuance, a fair
trial cannot possibly be had. And if the objection is being made at an in-
chambers conference, the objection must also be made on the record or
the court will deem the objection to be defaulted.2 Unless these measures
are taken, the Fourth Circuit has shown it is all too willing to summarily
dispose of the defendant's objection, as it did in Gray.
In Gray, for example, the Fourth Circuit stated that if the defense
had felt unprepared to undertake effective cross-examination, it should
have made a formal motion for continuance; instead, counsel had moved
only that the evidence be excluded. 3 The court further emphasized that
Gray had not advanced any meaningful contention as to how he would
have proceeded differently at the penalty phase had he known about the
additional evidence any sooner than the night before the penalty phase
was to begin. The court thus speculated that Gray's case would have
unfolded in much the same fashion that it did.4
I Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 59 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub
nom. Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. 690 (1996).
2 Id. at 64.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 66.
5 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:2 (1995).
6 LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 593-94, 304 S.E.2d
644, 660 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984) (quoting Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262,275-76 (1976)) (emphasis inLeVasseur). See also
B. State Your Objection Both as a Statutory and as a
Constitutional Violation
1. The Statutory Violation
In addition to establishing on the record the very real hardships the
undisclosed evidence imposes, it is critical to state the defendant's rights
which are being affected. First, note for the court that the Commonwealth
has violated the state statute which requires "[ulpon motion of the
defendant, in any [capital] case... if the... Commonwealth intends to
introduce during... sentencing... evidence of defendant's unadjudicated
criminal conduct, the ... Commonwealth shall give notice in writing..
• . [which] shall include a description of the alleged unadjudicated
criminal conduct and, to the extent such information is available, the time
and place such conduct will be alleged to have occurred." 5 To make such
a claim most effective, it is important that defense counsel press the
Commonwealth early on for disclosure of what unadjudicated acts it will
rely on and in what form. Then, any variance will take on even greater
significance.
It is critical, however, not to forget to also raise the federal
constitutional rights that are jeopardized or later federal review may be
foreclosed. Several federal constitutional rights are at stake when de-
fense counsel is ambushed.
2. Due Process and Eighth Amendment Rights to
Present Rebuttal Evidence
The Supreme Court of Virginia allows the Commonwealth to
present at a capital sentencing hearing evidence of a defendant's prior
unadjudicated conduct as proof that the defendant poses a future danger.
The court has justified the admissibility of such evidence based on the
United States Supreme Court's statement that "in determining the
probability of a defendant's future criminal conduct, it is 'essential...
that the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the
individual defendant whose fate it must determine."'
6
The Supreme Court, however, also has stated that, "it is now clear
that the sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the
requirements of the Due Process Clause. ' 7 Due process in this context
includes the requirement that a capital sentencing jury be provided
accurate sentencing information. Similarly, the Court has stated that
"'accurate sentencing information [is] an indispensable prerequisite to a
reasoned determination of whether a defendant shall live or die' under
the Eighth Amendment.
8
These well-established Due Process and Eighth Amendment rights
to a reliable sentencing hearing include the right to present rebuttal
evidence; "where the prosecution relies on a prediction of future danger-
ousness in requesting the death penalty, elemental due process principles
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992,998-1001 (1983) and Fenn, Anything
Someone Else Says Can and Will be UsedAgainst You in a Court ofLaw:
The Use of Unadjudicated Acts in Capital Sentencing, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 31 (1993).
7 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
8 Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 (1994)
(concurring opinion) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190
(1976)).
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operate to require admission of the defendant's relevant evidence in
rebuttal." 9 The Court, in Skipper v. South Carolina,10 stressed that, "it is
not only the [Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees as explained
in] Lockett and Eddings that require[] that the defendant be afforded an
opportunity to introduce evidence [in rebuttal of the prosecution's case
for future dangerousness]; it is also the elemental due process require-
ment that a defendant not be sentenced to death 'on the basis of
information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain."' 11 The
Court further explained, in a subsequent case, that "[tihe Constitution
guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the
basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the
Sixth Amendment[.] ' ' 12 Consequently, "[w]hen the prosecution urges a
defendant's future dangerousness as cause for the death sentence, the
defendant's right to be heard means that he must be afforded an
opportunity to rebut the argument."
13
The Supreme Court has noted that a capital sentencing proceeding
is essentially a trial in and of itself. Presenting evidence of unadjudicated
acts is essentially a mini-trial; the Commonwealth is presenting
unadjudicated acts to prove the charge that the defendant poses a future
danger, while the defendant is trying to counter these allegations. As with
any criminal charge, to meet the case against him the defendant must
have notice of the unadjudicated acts the Commonwealth intends to
introduce so that he may make Brady motions, investigate the alleged
conduct, find defense witnesses, make use of experts, prepare his
rebuttal, and make a motion for a continuance if necessary.
3. The Right to Notice
In Simmons v. South Carolina,14 Justice O'Connor's concurrence
noted that the capital defendant's right to rebut the prosecution's case for
a sentence of death goes beyond mere admissibility of the defendant's
relevant rebuttal evidence, but"'must of course satisfy the dictates of the
Due Process Clause,' and one of the hallmarks of due process in our
adversary system is the defendant's ability to meet the State's case
against him." 15 Justice O'Connor cited to the comparable holding of
Crane v. Kentucky,16 where the Court stated that a fair trial includes the
"'meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.' 17 Thus, any
process through which the State's evidence is permitted to escape "'the
crucible of meaningful adversarial testing' is to be condemned, 18 and
certainly lack of notice is such a process. In Lankford v. Idaho,19 the
United States Supreme Court reversed the defendant's death sentence
because it found that the defense did not have adequate notice that the
judge might sentence the defendant to death. The Court stated that the
9 Id. at 2194 (citing Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4,5 n.1
(1986) (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978))).
10 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
11 Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5, n.1 (quoting Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362).
See also Skipper, 476 U.S. at 9-11 (concurring opinion) and Simmons,
114 S. Ct. at 2200 (concurring opinion).
12 Crane v. Kentucky,476 U.S. 683,690 (1986) (quoting Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984)).
13 Simmons, 1145. Ct. at2199 (concurring opinion) (citing Skipper,
476 U.S. at 5, n.1).
14 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
15 Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2200 (concurring opinion) (quoting
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738,746 (1990) and citing Crane, 476
U.S. at 690).
16 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
17 Crane, 476 U.S. at 690 (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467
U.S. 479,485 (1984); and citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-85).
18 Id. at690-91 (quoting UnitedStates v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,656
(1984)).
inadequate notice had "frustrated counsel's opportunity to make an
argument that might have persuaded the [sentencer] to impose a different
sentence" 20 thus creating the "impermissible risk that the adversary
process may have malfunctioned ....- 21
In a different context, the Court has stated that although "'many
controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due
Process Clause... there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require
that.., adjudication be preceded by notice... appropriate to the nature
of the case.' 22 The Court further explained that "the timing and content
of the notice ... will depend on appropriate accommodation of the
competing interests involved."'23 As the Court noted in Goss v. Lopez,24
"' [n]o better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give
a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and an
opportunity to meet it."' 25 Given that Goss was a school disciplinary
case, certainly even more process is owed capital defendants at sentenc-
ing, and United States Supreme Court opinions have so indicated.
In Gardner v. Florida,26 the Court stressed that due process applies
in capital sentencing, and although the Gardner Court itself warned that
this "does not.., implicate the entire panoply of criminal trial procedural
rights," the Court went on to explain that "due process .... calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands." 27 In a capital
sentencing situation where the defendant is facing the ultimate sanction,
the demand for procedural protection is undoubtedly at its highest. As the
Supreme Court has often recognized, "the penalty of death is qualita-
tively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long,"28 and,
because of that qualitative difference, "the [Eighth] Amendment im-
poses a heightened standard 'for reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case' 29 .... and...
invalidates 'procedural rules that ten[d] to diminish the reliability of the
sentencing determination[.]' 30 The Court has thus concluded that
where contested information "is the basis for a death sentence, the
interest in reliability plainly outweighs the State's interest[s] .... 31
A lack of notice as to unadjudicated acts clearly implicates the
reliability of any proceeding and can be extremely debilitating in capital
sentencing procedures, especially at the penalty phase when counsel is
given last minute notice of evidence of unadjudicated acts. Without
notice the defendant will be unable to make proper Brady motions to
trigger Commonwealth disclosure of material exculpatory evidence. The
defendant will be precluded from sufficiently investigating the alleged
conduct and finding witnesses. The defendant will also be unable to
prepare his rebuttal. As a result of these deficiencies, the reliability of the
Commonwealth's case of "future dangerousness" will not have been
tested by a true adversarial proceeding.
19 500 U.S. 110 (1991).
20 Lankford, 500 U.S. at 124.
21 Id. at 127.
22 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (quoting Mullane v.
Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
23 Id. (citing Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961) and Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972)).
24 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
25 Goss, 419 U.S. at 580 (quoting Joint Anti-Facist Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170, 172-73 (1951) (concurring opinion)).
26 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
27 Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358, n.9 (quoting Morrisey, 408 U.S. at
481).
28 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
29 Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2198 (concurring opinion) (quoting
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305).
30 Id. (quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980)).
31 Gardner, 430 U.S. at 359.
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4. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The difficulties posed by a lack of notice raise yet another constitu-
tional basis for objecting to being ambushed by unadjudicated acts. In
such circumstances, counsel cannot provide the effective assistance that
is called for in Powell v. Alabama.
32
In Powell, the Court stated that the time leading up to trial is, in terms
of assistance of counsel, "perhaps the most critical period of the proceed-
ings against [the] defendant[].... when consultation, thorough-going
investigation and preparation [are] vitally important .... "33 The Powell
Court's emphasis on the need for trial counsel to have an adequate chance
to prepare applies with equal force to a capital sentencing hearing and the
Commonwealth's use of unadjudicated crimes to show future danger-
ousness. Any curtailment of an adequate opportunity to prepare for the
capital sentencing mini-trial will result in the same ineffective assistance
that Powell sought to prevent. The Powell Court further observed that
prejudice can exist even where defense counsel proceeded with investi-
gation and preparation that now, in the light of full disclosure, appears
insufficient. The Court stated, "[ilt is not enough to assume that counsel
... exercised their best judgment in proceeding to trial without prepara-
tion. Neither they nor the court could say what a prompt and thorough-
going investigation might disclose as to the facts. No attempt was made
to investigate. No opportunity to do so was given."
34
This last sentence is particularly important when dealing with
surprise unadjudicated acts evidence. While the Powell Court noted the
"grave evils" of inexcusable delays and continuances,35 it also recog-
nized that a defendant must not be deprived of sufficient time to have his
counsel prepare his defense. The Court stated, "[t]o do that is not to
proceed promptly in the claim ... of regulated justice but to go forward
with the haste of the mob,"'36 and further observed, "'[i]t is vain to give
the accused a day in court, with no opportunity to prepare for it, or to
guarantee him counsel without giving [counsel] any opportunity to
acquaint himself with the facts or law of the case.' 37 The Court held,
32 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
33 Powell, 287 U.S. at 57 (citing People ex rel. Burgess v. Riseley,
66 How.Pr.(N.Y.) 67 and Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69, 76, 125 N.E.
773 (1920)).
34 Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
35 Id. at 59.
36 Id.
37 Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. O'Keefe, 298 Pa. 169, 173, 148
A. 73, 74 (1929)).
therefore, that due process was not discharged by an assignment of
counsel "under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective
aid in the preparation and trial of the case."38 Even the dissent in Powell
believed that if defendants were "denied the right of counsel, with the
accustomed incidents of consultation and opportunity of preparation
for trial .... they were denied due process of law.. .. 39
CitingPowell, the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
that in certain circumstances when defense counsel has been denied
adequate notice, counsel may be so handicapped that they could not
possibly provide effective assistance of counsel. 40 In United States v.
Cronic, the Court stated that certain criteria were relevant to this
determination: "'(1) the time afforded for investigation and preparation;
(2) the experience of counsel; (3) the gravity of the charge; (4) the
complexity of possible defenses; and (5) the accessibility of witnesses to
counsel."'41
In capital sentencing situations, where defense counsel are faced
with surprise evidence of unadjudicated acts, counsel must explain how
the Cronic factors show that it is indeed a case where defense counsel
cannot possibly provide effective assistance of counsel. Although the
argument will vary as to the facts, at a minimum, defense counsel will be
able to state on the record, in strenuous fashion, that: the time afforded
for investigation and preparation is short, the experience of counsel in
preparing for a capital sentencing procedure is likely to be modest, the
gravity of the charge is unmatched, the complexity of all the possible
defenses involved in such a mini-trial are exceedingly intricate, and the
accessibility to witnesses is likely to be inadequate. Under such circum-
stances, and where the defendant is denied adequate notice, defense
counsel are so handicapped that they cannot possibly provide the
effective assistance of counsel that is required for the filing of Brady
motions, investigating the alleged conduct, finding witnesses, making
use of experts, preparing rebuttal, and making amotion fora continuance
if necessary.
38 Id. at 71.
39 Id. at 73-74 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
40 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-660 (1984).
41 Id. at 652 (quoting United States v. Golub, 638 F.2d 185, 189
(10th Cir. 1980)).
